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Showing posts with label attorney general. Show all posts
Showing posts with label attorney general. Show all posts

Saturday, July 18, 2020

Did the US Court of Appeals Get the Michael Flynn Decision Correct?


On June 24, 2020, a three judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued an order to the trial court to dismiss the charges of lying to the FBI against former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn.  The panel was split, two judges to one, with Trump appointee, Neomi Rao, delivering the opinion of the court.

Flynn has confessed to lying to the FBI about whether he had spoken with Russian Ambassador Segei Kislyak about official U.S. sanctions against Russia, imposed by the Obama Administration because of Russia’s interference with the 2016 presidential election, before Flynn had been appointed as the National Security Advisor.  This was a violation of the Logan Act, which makes it illegal for a private citizen to negotiate with a foreign power that has a claim against the United States.  You may recall that Flynn had the shortest term as National Security Advisor ever, as he was fired only twenty-two days into the Trump Administration.  He was fired for lying about this same subject matter, whether he spoke to Ambassador Kislyak about the sanctions before assuming office, to both Vice President Michael Pence and Chief of Staff Reince Priebus.  Legally speaking, was the Court of Appeals correct?

There is obviously a lot of context behind the Flynn prosecution.  I explain all of that context in another video.  I will have a link to that below.

This confession was obtained by Special Counsel Robert Mueller and his team as part of plea bargain.  Flynn would admit to lying to the FBI, and the Special Prosecutor would not bring further charges against Flynn and his son in connection with their lobbying work for arms of the Russian Government, and for the benefit of President Erdogan of Turkey.

Flynn confessed to his lie to the FBI in open court, and was awaiting sentencing.

Meanwhile, Trump was acquitted by the Senate following his impeachment by the House of representatives over his attempt to solicit Ukrainian interference in the 2020 presidential election.  Emboldened by his acquittal, Trump went on a rampage of vindictiveness, firing U.S. officials who had provided testimony before the House, firing the Inspector General who referred the matter to Congress, and seeking the dismissal of charges against the Russian defendants who were indicted by Robert Mueller and his team of investigators.  Indeed, Trump concerned over his own presidential legitimacy, enlisted the help of his Attorney General Bill Barr to paint the Mueller Investigation and resulting report as illegitimate. 

To that end, on April 30, 2020, Donald Trump tweeted his support of Michael Flynn, saying that what happened to him should not happen to any U.S. citizen again.  On week later, on May 7th, the Justice Department filed a motion to dismiss the charges against Michael Flynn, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a), and signed by interim United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, Michael Shae.  In response, the lead prosecutor in the case, Brandon L. Van Grack, withdrew from the case.  In fact, none of the attorneys who had been involved in the Flynn prosecution signed on to Shea's motion.

The trial judge, U.S. District Judge Emmet G. Sullivan, chose not to grant the motion to dismiss right away, instead setting a schedule to allow amicus curiae briefs, and appointing U.S. District Judge John Gleeson to present arguments against the motion to dismiss.  Flynn’s attorneys filed an emergency motion for a writ of mandamus with the D.C. Circuit, who, of course, issued its order to Judge Sullivan to dismiss the case.

At issue is the text of Federal Rule 48(a), which reads:  “The Attorney General or the United States attorney may by leave of court file a dismissal of an indictment, information or complaint and the prosecution shall thereupon terminate.”  The key language being, “by leave of the court.”  What exactly does this mean?  Does it give Judge Sullivan the authority look behind the Government’s motion and determine its motivations?

Judge Rao answered that it didn’t.  Quoting United States v Fokker Servs,, 818 F.3d 733 (D.C. Cir. 2016), Judge Rao claimed that the decision of whether to dismiss charges fell squarely within the discretion of the U.S. Attorney.  Judge Rao further claimed that the Supreme Court declined to construe the “leave of court” language “to confer any substantial role for courts in the determination  whether to dismiss charges.”  According to Rao, the trial court’s authority was limited to extraordinary circumstances, and that the rule’s principal objective was to prevent prosecutorial harassment.  That is, the situation where a prosecutor would file charges, dismiss them, and then refile them just to harass a defendant.

But was Judge Rao’s reasoning correct?

Well, first, let’s take a look at the case she cites to support her position.  The Fokker case involved a foreign company that had violated U.S. export licensing laws to export certain technology to Iran, Sudan and Myanmar.  The defendant company entered into an agreement with the government, which involved deferring prosecution over a period of time, while the company adhered to a set of conditions.  For the agreement to take effect, the court had to grant an exception to the Speedy Trial Act.  The trial court refused, expressing concern that the Government had chosen to prosecute only the company, and not the company’s executives who made the decisions to violate the exporting law.  The appellate court simply concluded that it wasn’t the trial court’s job to decide who the Government should prosecute.

Another case cited by Judge Rao was Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 263 (D.C. Cir. 1967).  This case involved two defendants charged with housebreaking and petty larceny.  The Government agreed to a plea bargain with one defendant that permitted him to plead guilty to a lesser misdemeanor charge.  The second defendant objected that he did not get the same deal.  By failing to give him the same deal, the second defendant argued that he was denied due process because he had equal standing as the first defendant.  That is, if you chose not to prosecute my friend, who was involved in the same crime, you should not be able to prosecute me.  The court rejected the argument, saying that selective prosecution alone was not sufficient to show a constitution violation.

The problem with both of these cases is that neither involved the application of Rule 48(a).  That is, neither case involved a Government’s motion to dismiss charges.  In both cases, the party at issue was being prosecuted, and there was merely criticism that some other party wasn’t being prosecuted for the same thing.

Well, specifically in reference to Rule 48(a), Judge Rao cited a Supreme Court case of Rinaldi  v.  United  States,  434  U.S.  22 (1977).  Citing footnote fifteen of that case, she stated, “More specifically, “[t]he principal object of the ‘leave of court’ requirement  is...to  protect  a  defendant against  prosecutorial  harassment ...when  the  Government moves   to   dismiss   an   indictment   over   the   defendant’s objection.”

So, what does Rinaldo say?  Does that case stand for the proposition that the “leave of court” language was meant only to prevent prosecutorial harassment?

Well, Rinaldi involved a defendant who was involved in a plot to rob safety deposit boxes.  His conduct could have been prosecuted under both Florida state law, and federal law.  Florida prosecuted and convicted.  The Federal Government then prosecuted, but it ended in a mistrial.  During the retrial, the judge asked the prosecutor whether he had authority to move forward with the case, because the U.S. Attorney’s Office had a policy that when the same conduct could be prosecuted under state and federal law, if the state obtained a conviction, the Federal Government would refrain from prosecution.  The Assistant U.S. Attorney said he had such authority.  The trial went forward and the defendant was convicted.

After conviction, the defendant’s attorney convinced the U.S. Attorney’s Office to drop the charges, based on the policy of not prosecuting when the state had already obtained a conviction.  The Government presented a motion to dismiss to the trial court.  The trial court denied the motion citing two reasons: (1) that the motion came after the trial was completed; and (2) that the trial attorney showed bad faith in prosecuting the case in the first place.

The appellate court upheld the denial of the motion, but only based on the bad faith of the trial attorney.  The Supreme Court reversed, saying that the issue was not the bad faith in prosecuting the case, but whether there was bad faith in seeking the dismissal of the charges.

And with that context, here’s the full text of the footnote in the Supreme Court’s decision in Rinaldi:

“The words "leave of court" were inserted in Rule 48(a) without explanation. While they obviously vest some discretion in the court, the circumstances in which that discretion may properly be exercised have not been delineated by this Court. The principal object of the "leave of court" requirement is apparently to protect a defendant against prosecutorial harassment, e. g., charging, dismissing, and recharging, when the Government moves to dismiss an indictment over the defendant's objection. . . . But the Rule has also been held to permit the court to deny a Government dismissal motion to which the defendant has consented if the motion is prompted by considerations clearly contrary to the public interest. . . .  It is unnecessary to decide whether the court has discretion under these circumstances, since, even assuming it does, the result in this case remains the same.”

The full text of that footnote clearly leaves open the possibility that some other reason, which is clearly contrary to the public interest, may prompt a court to deny a Government motion to dismiss charges.  And to support that proposition, the Supreme Court cited a Fifth Circuit case, United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1975).  In Cowan, the defendant faced  seven count indictment, six of which involved misapplication of federal funds of a federally insured savings and loan.  The charges were brought in the U.S. District for North Texas.  Meanwhile, that same defendant was charged with bribing a public official in connection with the Watergate investigation.  The Watergate Special Prosecutor entered into a plea agreement with the defendant.  If the defendant helped the Special Prosecutor, and pleaded guilty to bribing a public official, the U.S. Government would drop the charges in the Texas court.  The defendant agreed, and the U.S. Attorney filed a motion to dismiss the charges in the U.S. District Court in Texas.

The trial judge, however, had a problem with that, and denied the motion.  The U.S. Attorney filed an intent not to prosecute, and the trial judge appointed a Special Prosecutor for these charges.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered the extent of prosecutorial discretion, and Rule 48(a)’s requirement to seek “leave of the court.”  The Fifth Circuit noted that the Executive Branch has absolute discretion on whether to bring charges.  But on whether to dismiss charges is another matter.  Looking at the history of Rule 48(a), the court noted that in the common law, the prosecutor has absolute discretion to decide when to dismiss charges.  But, thirty states had abrogated that rule, requiring either a court order or leave of the court to dismiss charges once brought.  State law provided that the court had the power to deny a motion to dismiss to uphold the “public interest.”

With this background The American Law Institute issued its Model Code of Criminal Procedure.  This is just an attempt to put together the best practices of the states to suggest how the states could reform and harmonize their criminal procedure law.  At any rate, in the Model Code, The American Law Institute codified the state statutory law that gave courts wide discretion to deny leave to terminate a prosecution that had already been started.

So, the Supreme Court appointed a committee to consider changes to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  That committee suggested a change to the rules, which stated, "The Attorney General or the United States Attorney may file a dismissal of the indictment or information with a statement of the reasons therefor and the prosecution shall thereupon terminate."  That is, the Executive Branch still had broad discretion to decide when to terminate charges, but they would have to state their reasons.  Well, the Supreme Court read this proposal, and asked the committee, if the Executive Branch should have this much discretion.  In submitting the next set of proposals, the committee submitted the same rule, without change.  In adopting the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Supreme Court rejected the committee’s proposal, replacing the phrase “with a statement of the reasons thereof” with “leave of the court.”  The Court offered no explanation for this change.

Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit concluded that this demonstrated a clear intent on the part of the Supreme Court to give the trial court some role in determining whether a dismissal of criminal charges was appropriate.

To this end, the Fifth Circuit agreed that our Constitution is based on a separation of powers.  That is, Congress makes the laws, the Executive Branch, headed by the President, enforces the laws, and the courts hear cases to determine if a particular defendant has violated the law.  But, in order to protect against the abuse of power, the three branches are not absolutely separate, air-tight compartments.  Rather, we have a web of checks and balances on each branch’s powers that was designed to prevent abuse of power.  This is not to say that the rule gives courts unfettered ability to usurp or interfere with Executive’s good faith exercise of power to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.  But it is a check on power, and leave can be withheld if the dismissal of charges is clearly contrary to manifest public interest.

Now, in the facts of the Cowan case, the dismissal was not against public interest.  The plea bargain was not a sham or deception, and helped further another investigation.

When you put all of this together, you come to one inescapable conclusion.  Judge Rao was mistaken.  The “leave of court” language is not limited to preventing a prosecutor from harassing a defendant by dismissing a charge, and then refiling the same charge.  Instead, the rule gives the trial court the discretion to deny the motion, in extraordinary circumstances, where the dismissal of the charges would go against the manifest public interest.  And in determining the manifest public interest, it is appropriate for a trial court to consider whether the motion for dismissal was the result of bad faith.

In this case, the issue is the corruption of the Trump Administration.  Is Trump manipulating his Justice Department, first to discredit the Mueller Report, which clearly found that Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election, and outlined facts that support a conclusion that Donald Trump himself committed obstruction of justice with respect to the Mueller Investigation.  While the House may not have impeached him on this point, this does not mean that once Trump leaves office that the U.S. Attorney is forbidden from bringing obstruction of justice charges against Trump.  So, Trump needs to discredit the investigation.

Part of that is the argument that Attorney General Bill Barr had made, which is that the FBI investigation against Michael Flynn for violation of the Logan Act itself lacked legal authority.  Thus, Trump is using his pliant Attorney General both to ensure that his friend, Michael Flynn, gets favorable treatment despite confessing to lying to the FBI, and that the steps which led to the Mueller Investigation are discredited.  But simply, the motion to dismiss the charges against Flynn are the result of bad faith.

So what now?  The attorney representing Judge Sullivan filed a motion for rehearing en banc, meaning a hearing before all eleven judges of the D.C. Circuit, instead of just a panel of three.  Given that there is so little case law interpreting Rule 48(a), and the importance of this case, I would think it would be likely that the D.C. Circuit would grant a motion for rehearing en banc.  But even then, if Judge Rao’s decision stands, Judge Sullivan’s attorney could file for a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court.  That is, he could ask the U.S. Supreme Court to hear the case.  Once again, given the dearth of precedent on the issue, what appear to be clear error by Judge Rao, the fact that the Supreme Court is the overseer of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and that importance of this case, it seems like a very good possibility that the Supreme Court would want to hear this case and offer its guidance.

By: William J. Kovatch, Jr.

For Background information on  Michael Flynn, please see my YouTube Video, The Republican Party and Low Information Voters: Russia, Michael Flynn and Trump's Desire for Legitimacy.

For the YouTube video version of this article, click here:  https://youtu.be/_ZFJ7WLlno0


References
 
Rules


Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48.


Cases


In re: Michael T. Flynn, Crt No. 20-5143 (D.C. Cir. June 24, 2020).

Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 263 (D.C. Cir. 1967).

Rinaldi  v.  United  States,  434  U.S.  22 (1977).

United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1975).



United States v Fokker Servs,,818 F.3d 733 (D.C. Cir. 2016).


Articles


Framptom, Thomas Ward, "Why Do Rule 48(a) Dismissals Require 'Leave of Court,'" Stanford Law Review (Volume 73, June 2020).



Monday, September 30, 2019

Asylum for Victims of Domestic Abuse

Some of my proudest moments representing clients before Immigration Courts has been when I have won asylum for women from Central America who have been the victims of domestic abuse.  Unfortunately, in the Trump Administration's crack down on immigration, the future of such cases are seriously in doubt. 

Through asylum, the United States grants protection to people who find their life or well-being in jeopardy in their home country.  The legal standard for asylum is whether a person was a well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group.

Congress established the asylum standards through the Refugee Act of 1980.  In that Act, Congress did not define the term "particular social group."  The term, therefore, has been the subject of much litigation in asylum cases.  An entire set of cases from the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA), which is the administrative agency that normally hears appeals from Immigration Court decisions, has addressed this term, and developed case law establishing how it is to be defined in individual asylum cases.

In 2014, the "BIA" issued a decision in a case called Matter of A-R-C-G-.  Through that case, the BIA held that "married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship" constituted an appropriate particular social group upon which an asylum claim can be based.  After the BIA issued its decision, immigration lawyers would slightly modify the approved particular social group to fit the facts of their case.  Thus, a lawyer could define the particular social group to fit the country of origin, such as "married women from El Salvador . . . ."  Or, if the woman was in a committed relationship, but not legally married, the particular social group could be defined as "women in a committed relationship . . . ."

In June of 2018, however, Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued a decision in the immigration appeal of Matter of A-B-.  By statute, the Attorney General can choose to adjudicate an appeal from the Immigration Court himself, and issue a decision that is binding on all Immigration Judges.  Like Matter of A-R-C-G-, Matter of A-B- involved an asylum claim based on a Central American woman who was the victim of domestic violence.  The Attorney General overruled Matter of A-R-C-G-, contending that the BIA did not do an appropriate analysis of the term "particular social group."  Instead, according to the Attorney General, the BIA merely issued a decision based on a concession by both parties.  That is, the lawyers from the Department of Homeland Security, who represent the U.S. Government in appeals from Immigration Courts, served under the Obama Administration, and agreed with the asylum applicant that "married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship" was an appropriate particular social group.  Attorney General Sessions believed that it was not appropriate for a decision which did not go through the full analysis as set forth in the previous BIA to establish a general rule concerning the particular social group.

While that holding alone was dispositive of the case in Matter of A-B-, the Attorney General went further, proclaiming that any case based on private criminal activity, such as domestic violence and gang activity, were not likely to qualify for asylum.  This statement was not necessary to decide the case at hand, and thus lawyers would call it dicta.  Dicta is not a binding principle of law for lower courts.  However, many Immigration Judges read the Attorney General's statement as more than just mere dicta, and began using it as a rule to decline asylum applications based on domestic violence.

Matter of A-B- had consequences beyond the Immigration Court context.  Pursuant to U.S. law, if an alien is apprehended within 100 miles of the border less than 14 days after entering the United States, that alien can be expeditiously removed from the United States by an officer from Customs and Border Protection.  This is called expedited removal.  However, if that alien has a credible fear of persecution if returned to his or her home country, expedited removal does not apply, and the alien is referred to Immigration Court to have an asylum petition adjudicated.

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"), which administers asylum claims made outside of the Immigration Court system, created a process to determine when an alien has a credible fear of persecution.  Called "credible fear determinations," an asylum officer interviews the alien in a non-adversarial setting, and determines if that alien would likely be successful in filing an asylum application.  After Matter of A-B-, USCIS issued policy guidance that victims of gang violence or domestic violence could not receive a positive credible fear determination.

Twelve aliens who had been denied a positive credible fear determination sued the Attorney General in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.  In December of 2018, U.S. District Judge Emmet G. Sullivan issued a decision in the case of Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F.Supp. 3d 96 (D.D.C. 2018).  Judge Sullivan held that the general rule that an asylum applicant whose claim was based on domestic violence or gang violence could not qualify for a positive credible fear determination was arbitrary and capricious.  He therefore issued an injunction preventing the U.S. Government from applying that portion of Matter of A-B- in credible fear determinations.  The Government has, of course, appealed from this decision.

Specifically, the Judge found that there was no legal basis for a categorical denial of asylum claims based on domestic violence or gang related activities.  Furthermore, such  a rule would run counter to the individualized analysis required in every case by the statute.

Thus, the future of asylum claims based on domestic violence and gang violence remains in question.  On the one hand, a federal court has found a categorical ban, at least in the context of credible fear determinations, to be arbitrary and capricious.  On the other hand, the Trump Administration continues to fight for the ability to deny such asylum claims.

At the heart of Attorney General Sessions' reasoning was that domestic violence and gang-related activities were private crimes, and not the result of government action.  The basis of this argument is that asylum is meant to address persecution perpetrated by a foreign government, not a private citizen.  However, the legal standard in asylum cases is whether the persecution would be perpetrated by the government, or whether the government would be unable or unwilling to control the actions of the perpetrators.

In this regard, the argument in favor of granting asylum to victims of domestic violence centers on proving that the society is one where domestic violence is accepted, and which the government does nothing to address the problem, or is unable to address the problem.  That is, the government cannot turn a blind eye to the problem of domestic violence.

With respect to Central American countries, such as Honduras and El Salvador, the argument has been that the culture of machismo dominates society.  That is, women in such cultures are viewed as mere property of the male with whom they have a relationship.  Therefore, the government does not interfere when a woman becomes the victim of domestic violence.  Whether the applicant can prevail depends on the quality of evidence that can be presented demonstrating a patriarchal culture, and the acceptance of violence against women as a norm.  Assuming the applicant can demonstrate such government inaction on the issue of domestic violence, that applicant should be able to receive the protection of the United States through asylum.

By: William J. Kovatch, Jr.

Sunday, November 20, 2016

As Attorney General, Jeff Sessions Can Have Substantial Influence Over the Law of Deporrtation ans emoval

On Friday, President-Elect Donald Trump announced that Alabama Senator Jeff Sessions was his choice to serve as Attorney General.  Sessions has made it clear that he is anti-immigration.  Not anti-illegal immigration.  He is anti-immigration.  Painting with a wide brush, Sessions has made broad statements concerning the desirability of immigrants from the Dominican Republic, for example, claiming Dominicans as a class file fraudulent visa petition and that they have no provable skills that would benefit the United States.  Indeed, he has made statements that immigration -- legal immigration -- has been harmful to the United States.

The question arises as to exactly what influence Sessions would have over immigration policy if he were confirmed as Attorney General.  The answer is that the influence can be considerable, particularly with respect to immigration policy in deportation and removal cases.

The Department of Justice does not have the day to day responsibility for enforcing and administering the immigration law of the United States.  That role belongs to the Department of Homeland Security.  But this doe not mean that the Department of Justice has no say or influence over how immigration law is interpreted and enforced.

First the Department of Justice is responsible for representing the United States in litigation before the U.S. courts.  This means that the Justice Department, through the Office of the U.S. Attorney, assesses litigation risk and advises the agency being sued. 

This can mean that the Justice Department injects a bit of reasonableness when an agency is being sued.  The U.S. Attorney's Office can advise an agency that its action is not likely to convince a judge.  In this way, the Justice Department can subtly influence agency policy.

But the Justice Department can also agree to take a more extreme litigation position, thereby encouraging an agency to push the boundaries of the law.

The more important role that the Department of Justice plays in U.S. immigration law is through the operation of the administrative courts used to enforce the deportation and removal law.

Contrary to what many people believe, the U.S. Government cannot simply pick up a person who is present in the country in violation of the immigration law and deport him or her.  The U.S. Constitution guarantees the right to due process of law.  That is, it has to be proven that a person does not have legal status in the United States or that the person has violated that status by, for example, committing a crime.  Then, even if a person is present in the United States in violation of the immigration law, there may still be legal grounds for relief to allow that person to stay, such as asylum law.  Some entity has to make determination.

The entity that makes that determination is the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), which is housed by the Department of Justice.  The EOIR consists of the first level trial courts, that is the Immigration Courts, and the appellate body, known as the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).

In the first place, the Attorney General influences how immigration law is interpreted and enforced through the power of appointment and supervision.  The Attorney General appoints the Immigration Judges, the Members of the BIA, the Chief Immigration Judge and the Chair of the BIA.  Thus, so long as the people appointed meet the minimum requirements of competency, the Attorney General can be sure to appoint people who will interpret immigration law congruent with his thinking.  The EOIR also ensures of the training of Immigration Judges and BIA Members.  Such training programs can be used to subtly influence how the law is viewed and interpreted.

More importantly, by developing case law, the BIA, and indeed the Attorney General, can issue opinions binding on Immigration Judges in similar cases.  The BIA publishes its case decisions.  The BIA can vote to make a decision precedential, which means it announces an interpretation of the law that is binding on Immigration Judges.  The Attorney General may also decide to take jurisdiction over a case on appeal, and issue a decision announcing an interpretation of the law that is precedential.  Indeed, if the Attorney General takes jurisdiction over the case, he does not need to give the parties to the case an opportunity to brief the issues before him.

This power has been used in the past, for example, to define what constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude.  This can be an issue where a state criminal law defines an offense so broadly that it can include both behavior that is morally reprehensible, and behavior that isn't. 

This is the case with assault and battery.  To be considered a crime involving moral turpitude, assault and battery must be a crime of violence.  But, in many states, assault and battery can include a mere unwanted touching, such as a tap on the shoulder.  Moreover, when a defendant pleads guilty, the plea agreement may be worded so as to avoid admitting to actions that would constitute a crime of violence.  This leaves Immigration Judges in a tough position in determining if the conviction before them is actually a deportable offense or not.

In this situation, the Attorney General took jurisdiction over a case, and announced a rule that Immigration Judges could look beyond the record of conviction to determine if an assault and battery is a crime of violence, and thus a crime involving moral turpitude.  The Attorney General's decision permitted the Immigration Judge to go so far as to make conclusions based on the police report.  This particular rule was then the subject of extensive legislation, and has since been withdrawn by a successive Attorney General decision.

Nonetheless, the Attorney General can have substantial sway over immigration law as it applies to deportation and removal cases.  Given Sessions' history, I would expect that immigration law as it applies to deportation and removal cases will be interpreted more harshly.  Indeed, I would even expect interpretations that are constitutionally questionable for the sole purpose of pushing the envelope and seeing if the courts permit it.

By:  William J. Kovatch, Jr.
For an appointment call (703) 837-8832