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Sunday, July 26, 2020

Abductions in Portland: Are the Federal Laww Enforcement Extreme Aggressive Tactics Legal?


There is disturbing evidence of strange occurrences out of Portland, Oregon.

Videos and eye witness accounts spread across the Internet, detailing the action of armed men in camouflage fatigues and body armor pulling up in unmarked mini-vans, grabbing people off of the streets, and putting them in the back of those vans.  The reports began surfacing around July 14th, and Federal Government officials have admitted that these tactics are going on.

The story of Mark Pettibone and Connor O’Shea is chilling.  In the early morning hours of July 15th, Pettibone and O’Shea were heading home after spending the night in demonstrations.  The demonstrations were rather peaceful, with very little activity by either the Portland police or federal law enforcement.  While walking home, an unmarked mini-van pulled up in front of them, and four to five armed men in camouflage fatigues and body armor jumped out. 

O’Shea ran and hid, and began taking video with his phone.  Pettibone was caught, and thrown into the back of the van.  The men pulled the beanie he was wearing over his face and held his hands over his head.  Pettibone says he was driven around downtown Portland for a while, and then taken to a building.  He was patted down, and his belongings searched.  Officers put Pettibone in a cell, and later read him his Miranda rights.  No one told him why he was arrested.  But he was asked if he would waive his rights and answer some questions.  Pettibone demanded a lawyer, and was released about ninety minutes later.

Pettibone and O’Shea believe they were targeted merely because they were wearing black clothing near the area where demonstrations had occurred.  They denied engaging in activities such as spray painting any buildings, or using laser pointers to shine in the eyes of law enforcement officials.

Our Federal Government is one of limited power.  Whatever power it has, it has been given by the people, through the Constitution.  Keep in mind, in our system, the central government co-exists with state and local governments.  The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution makes it clear that if the Constitution does not give the Federal Government the power to do something, that power is reserved to the states or the people.  That is our federalist system.

The whole idea is that there are some issues that are inherently local.  The legal rules over those issues should be made by smaller governments, that are closer to the people.  Land use, health and safety issues, traffic rules, these are just a few examples of those types of issues.  Whereas foreign policy, trade among the states, establishing a common currency, these are all issues where a national government needs to be able to make the rules.

When you read the Constitution, you will find that it does not give the Federal Government the power to make rules and act to protect the health, safety and welfare of the people.  That is called the police power.  Through the auspices of the Tenth Amendment, the police power is reserved to the states.  That is why most criminal law is state law, and most law enforcement agencies are part of the state or local government.

For the Federal Government to be able to engage in criminal law enforcement activities, there has to be a federal hook.  Meaning, the activity being policed has to have some connection either to a power explicitly given to the Federal Government through the Constitution, or something that’s necessary in order for the Federal Government to do its job, like having employees or owning property.

For what’s going on in Portland, the federal hook is the protection of federally owned property.  The Federal Government needs to be able to own property to perform its functions.  It owns courthouses, office buildings, military installations.  Heck, the Federal Government owns parks for people to enjoy.

That’s why, for instance, it was the U.S. Park Police, an arm of the Federal Government, that used tear gas, flash-bang grenades, and brute force to push people out of Lafayette Square, a federally owned park, in early June, so President Trump could have a clear path to take his highly controversial photo op.

And keep in mind, I’m not saying how the Park Police did their job was legal.  There is an awful lot of documentation showing that their tactics to clear the park of demonstrators peacefully exercising their First Amendment rights, and news crews reporting on the demonstrations, was way over-aggressive and very likely a violation of law itself.

But getting back to Portland, the specific legal justification for federal law enforcement activities stems from Chapter 40 of the U.S. Code, section 1315.  This provision of law empowers the Secretary of Homeland Security to protect federally owned and occupied property, and the people on that property.  The Secretary is also empowered to designate employees of the Department of Homeland Security, as well as other federal employees transferred to the Department of Homeland Security, to be law enforcement officers for this purpose.

So far so good.  There is nothing really controversial about the Federal Government having the power to protect its property.  Nor is it controversial to give the Secretary the power to respond to requests by other federal agencies to deploy law enforcement officers to the requesting agency’s property.

But having the power to engage in law enforcement activities doesn’t necessarily mean that everything that the agency does in the name of protecting federal property is authorized by law.  Like every law enforcement agency, the Department of Homeland Security must exercise its powers consistently with the requirements of the Constitution.

Let’s take these abductions in the middle of downtown Portland in the early morning hours following a demonstration as an example.  Federal law enforcement activities are limited to federally owned or occupied properties.  That doesn’t mean that there is a magic line where the federal property stops and the federal agency therefore has no power to do anything.  The statute itself says the Department of Homeland Security’s authority extends to “areas outside the property to the extent necessary to protect the property and persons on the property.”  But that language and authority has to be interpreted with a degree of reasonableness. 

If U.S. law enforcement officers are protecting a federal courthouse for example, and someone from across the street has fireworks that he or she is aiming at the courthouse in order to do damage, it would be reasonable for the federal officers to be able to cross the street, regardless of whether that agency then crosses over into land that is not owned by the Federal Government, and arrest that person.

But it doesn’t give federal law enforcement officers the authority or power to drive around downtown Portland, blocks away from the federal courthouse, and randomly pick people up off of the streets.  That is what the Federal Government is being accused of doing.

Moreover, the exercise of law enforcement power must be reasonable.  An arrest, for example, must be based on a warrant, or probable cause.  So the statute empowers federal law enforcement officers to make an arrest without a warrant if a crime has been committed in their presence, or the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person being arrested has committed a felony.  And again, those specific powers are not in and of themselves controversial.

What is controversial, is grabbing someone off of the streets, blocks away from where a demonstration has taken place, hours after a demonstration has taken place, and assuming due to the color of the clothing that person is wearing, that that person has engaged in unlawful activities.  Especially when the officers are just grabbing the person, without announcing that they are law enforcement officers from the Federal Government, without announcing that the person is under arrest, without announcing why the person is being taken, and throwing that person in the back of an unmarked van.

That doesn’t look like an arrest.  That looks like kidnapping.

It doesn’t help that the law enforcement officers aren’t wearing traditional police uniforms.  They are wearing plan camouflage fatigues.  They are not wearing any clearly visible and identifiable insignia communicating that they are part of any government agency.  They are not wearing any name tag.  They are not showing any badge of office.  They have a tiny patch above the breast pocket that says “police.”  But that’s very ambiguous and not helpful. 

Let’s throw out there that there have been reports of right-wing militia type groups, some of whom are wearing military-style fatigues, mixing in with protesters, either to agitate or incite protesters into violence.

Under these circumstances, the actions of the federal officers is very dangerous, both to themselves and to the protesters.  Without a clearer indication of who these officers represent, it is very much reasonable for the person being abducted to assume that they are in fact being kidnapped, and possibly by these right-wing paramilitary groups.  It would be very reasonable, where the officers are not announcing who they are or why they are grabbing this person, for that person to fight back and try to protect themselves.

And while normally, as a lawyer, I would tell you, if you are being arrested or detained by a law enforcement officer, don’t fight back, and don’t physically resist,regardless of whether you think the arrest is legal, because such actions can themselves constitute a crime giving the officer further authority over you, in these cases how is the person supposed to know that they are being placed under arrest.

The danger created by federal law enforcement’s actions is further intensified by the fact the specific law enforcement officers in this case are not properly trained for the task at hand.  We’ve learned that the specific arm of the Department of Homeland Security assigned to protect the federal courthouse in Portland is the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol Tactical Unit, or BORTAC.  BORTAC’s primary law enforcement mission is to combat drug smugglers at the border.  And that is a very different type of law enforcement than crowd control.  BORTAC is simply not trained to keep the peace when it comes to large scale demonstrations.  Their tactics may very well be effective when you are talking about a member of the cartels trying to smuggle drugs across the Mexican border.  But it’s not the way to handle largely peaceful protesters exercising First Amendment rights.

Indeed, many critics of these abductions have likened the federal agents’ behavior to the disappearances of political opponents that often happens in third world tin-pot dictatorships.  Authoritarian dictatorships, like Venezuela, the right-wing’s favorite whipping boy when they engage in scare tactics to warn the electorate against turning socialist.

When you examine the root cause of this current campaign in Portland, the parallels between the Department of Homeland Security’s current actions, and those of authoritarian regimes because inescapable.

These actions are tied to a campaign to protect federal monument, memorials and statues, as outlined in President Trump’s June 26, 2020 Executive Order.  But the language Trump uses in that order is just striking.  In the preamble, Trump rails against “left-wing extremists,” whom he claims “call for the destruction of the United States system of government.”  His call to action is filled with references to “anarchists,” “left-wing extremists,” “fringe ideolog[ies],” and “Marxism.”  Trump is not even trying to hide his motivation in signing this Executive Order, and that is political.  He is targeting people and groups because of their political beliefs, and because of their involvement in left-wing politics.

Trump seems to conveniently forget that one of this country’s greatest values is the protection of free speech, and specifically, the protection of political speech meant to criticize the government and its leaders.  The fact that a sitting president feels so comfortable attacking political ideologies critical of his Administration is nothing less than shocking.  This is what authoritarian regimes do.

But Trump goes further.  He clothes his campaign against his political opponents in the supposed need to combat rioters.  But, in doing so, he deliberately conflates peaceful expression of protected political speech with the incidental violence that has coincided with the most recent protests.

This is not to say that violence hasn’t occurred since the protests over the killing of George Floyd by Minneapolis police began at the end of May.  It certainly has.  But the causes of that violence has been complex, and it is not necessarily true that the main proponents of the violence have been those who have protested against police brutality targeted at African-Americans and in support of Black Lives Matter. Indeed, some of the violence has been instigated by overly-aggressive police tactics aimed at the peaceful protesters.

The point is that you can’t presume that people gathered at or near federal properties to protest against institutional racism are going to engage in violence or property damage.

Turning back to Portland, it is true that federal properties, including the federal courthouse, have been damaged in the most recent demonstrations.  The damage to the courthouse after July 4th appears to stand out in the minds of Homeland Security officials.  Specifically, in the early morning hours, at around 4:00 AM, about a thousand people had gathered at the federal courthouse, and launched commercial fireworks at the building.  Because no one was in the building at the time, the Portland police concluded that there was no immediate threat to any person’s life or safety, and decided against dispelling the crowd.

Now, I’m not in a position to second guess the actions of the Portland police.  It can certainly be argued that police presence could have served to escalate the situation, and incited that crowd to turn toward more violence.  In their judgment, it was better to wait it out.

This doesn’t prevent either the state or federal officials from prosecuting anyone involved in the July 4th incident.  In this modern society, video cameras seem to be everywhere in the public space.  To the extent that law enforcement officials are able to obtain evidence that implicates any specific person in the damage to the federal courthouse, by all means, that would be an appropriate exercise of law enforcement authority.

But President Trump and Homeland Security officials have used this incident not only to criticize local political decision-makers, but as an excuse essentially to usurp state and local law enforcement entities, with shock troops from the U.S. Marshal Service and the Department of Homeland Security.  On July 16th, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, Chad Wolf, released a statement condemning the “failed response” of state and local leaders.  In a laundry list of damage to federal properties in Portland, Wolf justified the Department’s enhanced law enforcement activities in Portland; activities that the state and local leaders neither requested, nor wanted.  Some of the items listed in the Homeland Security release appear like desperate attempts to paint a dire picture for public relations purposes.  The list includes items such as graffiti, taking down temporary fencing, plywood and wooden barriers, and ripping a card reader off of its mount.  This is not to defend those who were causing property damage, or to say that the Federal government didn’t have the right to take some action to protect federal property.  But the response has been way out of proportion to the damage sustained.

It bears noting, that Homeland security’s response has trampled on the very notion of states’ rights, a concept that the right-wing usually champions in political discourse.  Moreover, Trump and Homeland Security officials have overstepped their authority.

Even before federal thugs in rented mini-vans were abducting random people off the streets in Portland, the U.S. Marshal Service was continuing the trend we have seen nationwide in response to the George Floyd protests.  And that is overly aggressive tactics against peaceful demonstrators.  Specifically, on July 12th, a twenty-six year old man had joined demonstrators across the street from the federal courthouse.  He was holding a speaker over his head with both hands.  He was unarmed.  One of the Marshals took that as an opportunity to shoot the young man in the head with a so-called non-lethal impact munition.  The man fell to the ground, unconscious and bleeding profusely.  He had fractures in his face and skull, and required surgery.

The Federal Government hasn’t denied that these things have happened.  Quite the contrary, Trump and Homeland Security officials have threatened further escalation.  Trump is threatening to expand the use of federal officers to cities like New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Baltimore and Oakland, because these cities are, in Trump’s words, run by “liberal Democrats.”  That’s right.  The political party of the chief executive of major metropolitan cities is being used as the reason to threaten the wide-scale deployment federal stormtroopers.

This is a threat that has been backed up by Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security Ken Cuccinelli, who cited vague “intelligence about planned attacks on federal facilities,” in response to the enhanced federal activities in Portland, and warned, “If we get the same kind of intelligence in other places . . . we would respond in the same manner.”

Indeed, in the wake of the federal action in Portland, it has been revealed that the Department of Homeland Security has been spying on people domestically, thought to be threats to monument, memorial and statues.  Moreover, the intelligence being gathered is not limited to statues that are owned by the Federal Government. That’s an awful lot of resources being expended on protecting lifeless representations of people long dead.

Trump’s real motivation is to quell demonstrations that call attention to systemic racism that plague law enforcement agencies across the country.  Trump has clearly allied himself with white nationalists and others who would deny that systemic racism is a problem.  Specifically, Trump opposes the move to remove statues and memorials dedicated to Confederate soldiers and politicians from the public space.  He highlights the vandalism and damage to such statues in his call for greater federal protection.

Trump has equated patriotism with the veneration of approved national symbols and historic figures, with no debate over whether the beliefs, actions and behaviors of these national figures actually merits the honor of having a statue in the public square.  To motivate his white nationalist allies, Trump likes to expand the discussion, and highlight the odd exceptions to the call for the removal of Confederate historical figures.  His Executive Order, for example, references the statue of Ulysses S. Grant in San Francisco.  But, Trump conveniently leaves out that while Grant fought against the Confederacy, he himself owned a slave in his lifetime, and his wife inherited slaves.  This is the very inconsistency that movements like Black Lives Matter have been pointing out, and that Americans who want their government to live up to the ideals and principles of our Founding Fathers, principles such as liberty and equality, ought to be able to question without having their patriotism impugned.

More disturbingly, Trump called attention to “Christian figures” supposedly “in the cross-hairs, too.”  Although Trump failed to mention any such Christian figures by name, in California a statue of Franciscan monk Junipero Serra has been removed.  And while Father Serra attempted to protect indigenous Americans from the abuse of Spanish Conquistadors, he was still part of the drive of the Spanish Catholic Church to eradicate the religious beliefs of Native Americans, and compel them to adopt Catholicism.

Yet, Trump uses this as justification to protect religious symbols and property, specifically mentioning depictions of Jesus, through federal action.  Trump cites the Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996, and in doing so, he turns the very purpose of that Act of Congress on its head.  Historically speaking, church burnings have been acts of intimidation perpetrated by white supremacists, such as members of the Ku Klux Klan, against the African American community.  The Church Arson Prevention Act was not meant to protect Christianity, per se.  It was meant to fight racial discrimination.  And here, Trump is invoking it to further the interests of white nationalists, who like to argue that the United States was founded on Judeo-Christian principles, and often use that as an excuse for discrimination against no-Christian Americans, such as Muslims.

This is very much at odds with the Establishment Claus of the First Amendment, which prevents the Federal Government from establishing a state religion.  Trump cannot show favoritism to any specific religion.  Yet, that is exactly what he has done by including the protection of Christian property and symbols as a goal in his Executive Order.

What is striking about all of this, is just how pointless it is.  Mark Pettibone, for example, asserted his right to an attorney, and the federal agents simply released him.  It is almost as if federal agents are just picking people up in the vicinity of where demonstrations took place, without cause and without any criminal charges, just in the hopes that someone waives their Miranda rights and incriminates himself.  Anne Applebaum, a writer for The Atlantic, has described these activities as “performative authoritarianism.”  That is, it is aimed at appealing to Trump’s base by making an apparent show of force, but a show that it meaningless as it fails to accomplish any true law enforcement aims.  If anything, it only telegraphs the ultimate impotence of the Trump Administration, while communicating that certain segments of American society are going to be treated as enemies.  These actions do set a dangerous precedent, as they firmly set America further down the road towards authoritarianism.

By: William J. Kovatch, Jr.

For the YouTube video of this article, click here:  https://youtu.be/hbqWB_3SULc

Photograph of federal officers in Portland on July 15, 2020, from Macha Chai on Twitter (@macha_chai), depicts unidentified officers who took a man off the streets and threw him in an unmarked mini-van without identifying who they were, or why the man was being abducted.  Photograph is used for the purpose of education, commentary, and research.

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Saturday, July 18, 2020

Did the US Court of Appeals Get the Michael Flynn Decision Correct?


On June 24, 2020, a three judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued an order to the trial court to dismiss the charges of lying to the FBI against former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn.  The panel was split, two judges to one, with Trump appointee, Neomi Rao, delivering the opinion of the court.

Flynn has confessed to lying to the FBI about whether he had spoken with Russian Ambassador Segei Kislyak about official U.S. sanctions against Russia, imposed by the Obama Administration because of Russia’s interference with the 2016 presidential election, before Flynn had been appointed as the National Security Advisor.  This was a violation of the Logan Act, which makes it illegal for a private citizen to negotiate with a foreign power that has a claim against the United States.  You may recall that Flynn had the shortest term as National Security Advisor ever, as he was fired only twenty-two days into the Trump Administration.  He was fired for lying about this same subject matter, whether he spoke to Ambassador Kislyak about the sanctions before assuming office, to both Vice President Michael Pence and Chief of Staff Reince Priebus.  Legally speaking, was the Court of Appeals correct?

There is obviously a lot of context behind the Flynn prosecution.  I explain all of that context in another video.  I will have a link to that below.

This confession was obtained by Special Counsel Robert Mueller and his team as part of plea bargain.  Flynn would admit to lying to the FBI, and the Special Prosecutor would not bring further charges against Flynn and his son in connection with their lobbying work for arms of the Russian Government, and for the benefit of President Erdogan of Turkey.

Flynn confessed to his lie to the FBI in open court, and was awaiting sentencing.

Meanwhile, Trump was acquitted by the Senate following his impeachment by the House of representatives over his attempt to solicit Ukrainian interference in the 2020 presidential election.  Emboldened by his acquittal, Trump went on a rampage of vindictiveness, firing U.S. officials who had provided testimony before the House, firing the Inspector General who referred the matter to Congress, and seeking the dismissal of charges against the Russian defendants who were indicted by Robert Mueller and his team of investigators.  Indeed, Trump concerned over his own presidential legitimacy, enlisted the help of his Attorney General Bill Barr to paint the Mueller Investigation and resulting report as illegitimate. 

To that end, on April 30, 2020, Donald Trump tweeted his support of Michael Flynn, saying that what happened to him should not happen to any U.S. citizen again.  On week later, on May 7th, the Justice Department filed a motion to dismiss the charges against Michael Flynn, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a), and signed by interim United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, Michael Shae.  In response, the lead prosecutor in the case, Brandon L. Van Grack, withdrew from the case.  In fact, none of the attorneys who had been involved in the Flynn prosecution signed on to Shea's motion.

The trial judge, U.S. District Judge Emmet G. Sullivan, chose not to grant the motion to dismiss right away, instead setting a schedule to allow amicus curiae briefs, and appointing U.S. District Judge John Gleeson to present arguments against the motion to dismiss.  Flynn’s attorneys filed an emergency motion for a writ of mandamus with the D.C. Circuit, who, of course, issued its order to Judge Sullivan to dismiss the case.

At issue is the text of Federal Rule 48(a), which reads:  “The Attorney General or the United States attorney may by leave of court file a dismissal of an indictment, information or complaint and the prosecution shall thereupon terminate.”  The key language being, “by leave of the court.”  What exactly does this mean?  Does it give Judge Sullivan the authority look behind the Government’s motion and determine its motivations?

Judge Rao answered that it didn’t.  Quoting United States v Fokker Servs,, 818 F.3d 733 (D.C. Cir. 2016), Judge Rao claimed that the decision of whether to dismiss charges fell squarely within the discretion of the U.S. Attorney.  Judge Rao further claimed that the Supreme Court declined to construe the “leave of court” language “to confer any substantial role for courts in the determination  whether to dismiss charges.”  According to Rao, the trial court’s authority was limited to extraordinary circumstances, and that the rule’s principal objective was to prevent prosecutorial harassment.  That is, the situation where a prosecutor would file charges, dismiss them, and then refile them just to harass a defendant.

But was Judge Rao’s reasoning correct?

Well, first, let’s take a look at the case she cites to support her position.  The Fokker case involved a foreign company that had violated U.S. export licensing laws to export certain technology to Iran, Sudan and Myanmar.  The defendant company entered into an agreement with the government, which involved deferring prosecution over a period of time, while the company adhered to a set of conditions.  For the agreement to take effect, the court had to grant an exception to the Speedy Trial Act.  The trial court refused, expressing concern that the Government had chosen to prosecute only the company, and not the company’s executives who made the decisions to violate the exporting law.  The appellate court simply concluded that it wasn’t the trial court’s job to decide who the Government should prosecute.

Another case cited by Judge Rao was Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 263 (D.C. Cir. 1967).  This case involved two defendants charged with housebreaking and petty larceny.  The Government agreed to a plea bargain with one defendant that permitted him to plead guilty to a lesser misdemeanor charge.  The second defendant objected that he did not get the same deal.  By failing to give him the same deal, the second defendant argued that he was denied due process because he had equal standing as the first defendant.  That is, if you chose not to prosecute my friend, who was involved in the same crime, you should not be able to prosecute me.  The court rejected the argument, saying that selective prosecution alone was not sufficient to show a constitution violation.

The problem with both of these cases is that neither involved the application of Rule 48(a).  That is, neither case involved a Government’s motion to dismiss charges.  In both cases, the party at issue was being prosecuted, and there was merely criticism that some other party wasn’t being prosecuted for the same thing.

Well, specifically in reference to Rule 48(a), Judge Rao cited a Supreme Court case of Rinaldi  v.  United  States,  434  U.S.  22 (1977).  Citing footnote fifteen of that case, she stated, “More specifically, “[t]he principal object of the ‘leave of court’ requirement  is...to  protect  a  defendant against  prosecutorial  harassment ...when  the  Government moves   to   dismiss   an   indictment   over   the   defendant’s objection.”

So, what does Rinaldo say?  Does that case stand for the proposition that the “leave of court” language was meant only to prevent prosecutorial harassment?

Well, Rinaldi involved a defendant who was involved in a plot to rob safety deposit boxes.  His conduct could have been prosecuted under both Florida state law, and federal law.  Florida prosecuted and convicted.  The Federal Government then prosecuted, but it ended in a mistrial.  During the retrial, the judge asked the prosecutor whether he had authority to move forward with the case, because the U.S. Attorney’s Office had a policy that when the same conduct could be prosecuted under state and federal law, if the state obtained a conviction, the Federal Government would refrain from prosecution.  The Assistant U.S. Attorney said he had such authority.  The trial went forward and the defendant was convicted.

After conviction, the defendant’s attorney convinced the U.S. Attorney’s Office to drop the charges, based on the policy of not prosecuting when the state had already obtained a conviction.  The Government presented a motion to dismiss to the trial court.  The trial court denied the motion citing two reasons: (1) that the motion came after the trial was completed; and (2) that the trial attorney showed bad faith in prosecuting the case in the first place.

The appellate court upheld the denial of the motion, but only based on the bad faith of the trial attorney.  The Supreme Court reversed, saying that the issue was not the bad faith in prosecuting the case, but whether there was bad faith in seeking the dismissal of the charges.

And with that context, here’s the full text of the footnote in the Supreme Court’s decision in Rinaldi:

“The words "leave of court" were inserted in Rule 48(a) without explanation. While they obviously vest some discretion in the court, the circumstances in which that discretion may properly be exercised have not been delineated by this Court. The principal object of the "leave of court" requirement is apparently to protect a defendant against prosecutorial harassment, e. g., charging, dismissing, and recharging, when the Government moves to dismiss an indictment over the defendant's objection. . . . But the Rule has also been held to permit the court to deny a Government dismissal motion to which the defendant has consented if the motion is prompted by considerations clearly contrary to the public interest. . . .  It is unnecessary to decide whether the court has discretion under these circumstances, since, even assuming it does, the result in this case remains the same.”

The full text of that footnote clearly leaves open the possibility that some other reason, which is clearly contrary to the public interest, may prompt a court to deny a Government motion to dismiss charges.  And to support that proposition, the Supreme Court cited a Fifth Circuit case, United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1975).  In Cowan, the defendant faced  seven count indictment, six of which involved misapplication of federal funds of a federally insured savings and loan.  The charges were brought in the U.S. District for North Texas.  Meanwhile, that same defendant was charged with bribing a public official in connection with the Watergate investigation.  The Watergate Special Prosecutor entered into a plea agreement with the defendant.  If the defendant helped the Special Prosecutor, and pleaded guilty to bribing a public official, the U.S. Government would drop the charges in the Texas court.  The defendant agreed, and the U.S. Attorney filed a motion to dismiss the charges in the U.S. District Court in Texas.

The trial judge, however, had a problem with that, and denied the motion.  The U.S. Attorney filed an intent not to prosecute, and the trial judge appointed a Special Prosecutor for these charges.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered the extent of prosecutorial discretion, and Rule 48(a)’s requirement to seek “leave of the court.”  The Fifth Circuit noted that the Executive Branch has absolute discretion on whether to bring charges.  But on whether to dismiss charges is another matter.  Looking at the history of Rule 48(a), the court noted that in the common law, the prosecutor has absolute discretion to decide when to dismiss charges.  But, thirty states had abrogated that rule, requiring either a court order or leave of the court to dismiss charges once brought.  State law provided that the court had the power to deny a motion to dismiss to uphold the “public interest.”

With this background The American Law Institute issued its Model Code of Criminal Procedure.  This is just an attempt to put together the best practices of the states to suggest how the states could reform and harmonize their criminal procedure law.  At any rate, in the Model Code, The American Law Institute codified the state statutory law that gave courts wide discretion to deny leave to terminate a prosecution that had already been started.

So, the Supreme Court appointed a committee to consider changes to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  That committee suggested a change to the rules, which stated, "The Attorney General or the United States Attorney may file a dismissal of the indictment or information with a statement of the reasons therefor and the prosecution shall thereupon terminate."  That is, the Executive Branch still had broad discretion to decide when to terminate charges, but they would have to state their reasons.  Well, the Supreme Court read this proposal, and asked the committee, if the Executive Branch should have this much discretion.  In submitting the next set of proposals, the committee submitted the same rule, without change.  In adopting the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Supreme Court rejected the committee’s proposal, replacing the phrase “with a statement of the reasons thereof” with “leave of the court.”  The Court offered no explanation for this change.

Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit concluded that this demonstrated a clear intent on the part of the Supreme Court to give the trial court some role in determining whether a dismissal of criminal charges was appropriate.

To this end, the Fifth Circuit agreed that our Constitution is based on a separation of powers.  That is, Congress makes the laws, the Executive Branch, headed by the President, enforces the laws, and the courts hear cases to determine if a particular defendant has violated the law.  But, in order to protect against the abuse of power, the three branches are not absolutely separate, air-tight compartments.  Rather, we have a web of checks and balances on each branch’s powers that was designed to prevent abuse of power.  This is not to say that the rule gives courts unfettered ability to usurp or interfere with Executive’s good faith exercise of power to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.  But it is a check on power, and leave can be withheld if the dismissal of charges is clearly contrary to manifest public interest.

Now, in the facts of the Cowan case, the dismissal was not against public interest.  The plea bargain was not a sham or deception, and helped further another investigation.

When you put all of this together, you come to one inescapable conclusion.  Judge Rao was mistaken.  The “leave of court” language is not limited to preventing a prosecutor from harassing a defendant by dismissing a charge, and then refiling the same charge.  Instead, the rule gives the trial court the discretion to deny the motion, in extraordinary circumstances, where the dismissal of the charges would go against the manifest public interest.  And in determining the manifest public interest, it is appropriate for a trial court to consider whether the motion for dismissal was the result of bad faith.

In this case, the issue is the corruption of the Trump Administration.  Is Trump manipulating his Justice Department, first to discredit the Mueller Report, which clearly found that Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election, and outlined facts that support a conclusion that Donald Trump himself committed obstruction of justice with respect to the Mueller Investigation.  While the House may not have impeached him on this point, this does not mean that once Trump leaves office that the U.S. Attorney is forbidden from bringing obstruction of justice charges against Trump.  So, Trump needs to discredit the investigation.

Part of that is the argument that Attorney General Bill Barr had made, which is that the FBI investigation against Michael Flynn for violation of the Logan Act itself lacked legal authority.  Thus, Trump is using his pliant Attorney General both to ensure that his friend, Michael Flynn, gets favorable treatment despite confessing to lying to the FBI, and that the steps which led to the Mueller Investigation are discredited.  But simply, the motion to dismiss the charges against Flynn are the result of bad faith.

So what now?  The attorney representing Judge Sullivan filed a motion for rehearing en banc, meaning a hearing before all eleven judges of the D.C. Circuit, instead of just a panel of three.  Given that there is so little case law interpreting Rule 48(a), and the importance of this case, I would think it would be likely that the D.C. Circuit would grant a motion for rehearing en banc.  But even then, if Judge Rao’s decision stands, Judge Sullivan’s attorney could file for a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court.  That is, he could ask the U.S. Supreme Court to hear the case.  Once again, given the dearth of precedent on the issue, what appear to be clear error by Judge Rao, the fact that the Supreme Court is the overseer of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and that importance of this case, it seems like a very good possibility that the Supreme Court would want to hear this case and offer its guidance.

By: William J. Kovatch, Jr.

For Background information on  Michael Flynn, please see my YouTube Video, The Republican Party and Low Information Voters: Russia, Michael Flynn and Trump's Desire for Legitimacy.

For the YouTube video version of this article, click here:  https://youtu.be/_ZFJ7WLlno0


References
 
Rules


Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48.


Cases


In re: Michael T. Flynn, Crt No. 20-5143 (D.C. Cir. June 24, 2020).

Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 263 (D.C. Cir. 1967).

Rinaldi  v.  United  States,  434  U.S.  22 (1977).

United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1975).



United States v Fokker Servs,,818 F.3d 733 (D.C. Cir. 2016).


Articles


Framptom, Thomas Ward, "Why Do Rule 48(a) Dismissals Require 'Leave of Court,'" Stanford Law Review (Volume 73, June 2020).